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Abstract
Algorithms for approximate Bayesian inference, such as those based on sampling (i.e., Monte
Carlo methods), provide a natural source of models of how people may deal with uncertainty with
limited cognitive resources. Here, we consider the idea that individual differences in working
memory capacity (WMC) may be usefully modeled in terms of the number of samples, or “parti-
cles,” available to perform inference. To test this idea, we focus on two recent experiments that
report positive associations between WMC and two distinct aspects of categorization performance:
the ability to learn novel categories, and the ability to switch between different categorization
strategies (“knowledge restructuring”). In favor of the idea of modeling WMC as a number of par-
ticles, we show that a single model can reproduce both experimental results by varying the num-
ber of particles—increasing the number of particles leads to both faster category learning and
improved strategy-switching. Furthermore, when we fit the model to individual participants, we
found a positive association between WMC and best-fit number of particles for strategy switching.
However, no association between WMC and best-fit number of particles was found for category
learning. These results are discussed in the context of the general challenge of disentangling the
contributions of different potential sources of behavioral variability.
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1. Introduction
How to deal with uncertainty arising from noisy and incomplete information is a ubiq-
uitous challenge for natural and artificial agents alike. Bayesian statistics provides a rigor-
ous system for representing and reasoning about such uncertainty, yielding a principled
method for updating beliefs in the light of new evidence (Bernardo & Smith, 1994).
Human behavior is often well described in terms of Bayesian inference, from “low level”
sensorimotor (K€ording & Wolpert, 2004) and perceptual (Yuille & Kersten, 2006) phe-
nomena, to “high level” competencies, such as causal reasoning (Griffiths & Tenenbaum,
2005), category learning (Sanborn, Navarro, & Griffiths, 2010), and predictions about
future everyday events (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006; reviews include Chater & Oaks-
ford, 2008; Sanborn & Chater, 2016; Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011).
How humans frequently—though by no means always (e.g., Tversky & Kahnman,
1974)—achieve this consistency with Bayesian principles is less clear. Though simple in
principle, exact Bayesian calculations are frequently intractable in real-world settings,
leading to a need for approximations. In statistics and computer science, this challenge
has been met through the development of powerful, general purpose techniques for
approximate Bayesian inference, such as Monte Carlo methods (Gelfand & Smith, 1990;
Robert & Casella, 2004), which allow for the practical application of Bayesian methods
in complex domains.
The practical success of these techniques has naturally led to an interest in whether
they also tell us something about how people reason under uncertainty. That is, they pro-
vide one source of hypotheses about the nature of the psychological and neural mecha-
nisms that underlie how people process probabilistic information (Chater & Oaksford,
2008; Doya, Ishii, Pouget, & Rao, 2007). Since the aim of these algorithms is to approxi-
mate the normative solution to a computational problem—that is, to approximate Baye-
sian inference—they have been called rational process models when considered as
candidate psychological mechanisms (Griffiths, Vul, & Sanborn, 2012; Sanborn et al.,
2010). This distinguishes them from traditional process models in cognitive psychology,
which are typically rich in postulated psychological mechanisms but often poor in terms
of normative foundations (cf. Anderson, 1990).
Importantly, Monte Carlo methods can in principle approximate probabilistic inference
arbitrarily well when sufficient time and memory are available, thereby providing a
benchmark for ideal performance. At the same time, these methods display systematic
deviations from the normative solution when resources are limited. Such “qualitative fin-
gerprints” associated with different species of approximation may then be particularly
illuminating when considering human cognition, where it is generally assumed that infor-
mation processing capacity is limited (Daw, Courville, & Dayan, 2008; Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 1996; Kahneman, 2003; Simon, 1982).
One such limitation has long been associated with working memory (Cowan, 2001;
Miller, 1956), defined in cognitive psychology as the memory system responsible for tem-
porary storage and manipulation of task-relevant information (Baddeley, 1992; Baddeley
& Hitch, 1974). Individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC), such as
2 of 43 K. Lloyd et al. / Cognitive Science 43 (2019)
measured in the complex span paradigm (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), have been found
to predict performance on a variety of cognitive tasks, including conventional intelligence
tests (Conway, Jarrold, Kane, Miyake, & Towse, 2007). Indeed, WMC may account for
up to one half of the variance in general intelligence (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003).
However, the exact nature of the WMC limitation that underpins such individual dif-
ferences remains the subject of debate, with proposals variously emphasizing decay of
representations (e.g., Baddeley, Thompson, & Buchanan, 1975), resource constraints (e.g.,
Just & Carpenter, 1992), or interference (e.g., Oberauer & Kliegl, 2006; see Oberauer,
Farrell, Jarrold, & Lewandowsky, 2016 for a recent discussion). Indeed, opinions continue
to differ as to whether working memory is best conceptualized as discrete, for example,
comprising a limited number of “slots,” or as a more continuous “resource” that can be
flexibly distributed across representations in memory (Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014;
Suchow, Fougnie, Brady, & Alvarez, 2014).
Our approach in the current work is to consider WMC limitations within the broader
context of probabilistic inference, asking whether WMC may be usefully modeled as a
constraint on the amount of inferential resources available. The implication is that at least
in tasks involving uncertainty, enhanced performance in individuals with higher WMC
may be attributable to an ability to better approximate “ideal” Bayesian solutions.
To begin to explore this idea, we focus on recent experiments showing positive associ-
ations between WMC and performance on category learning tasks (Lewandowsky, 2011;
Lewandowsky, Yang, Newell, & Kalish, 2012; Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2011, 2012).
This focus is motivated by two considerations. First, category learning tasks are well
characterized as probabilistic inference problems, requiring participants to reason about
possible underlying category structures. Even when the mapping between stimuli and cat-
egory labels is deterministic, participants face epistemic uncertainty regarding the nature
of this mapping. Normative solutions to such problems, as well as how these solutions
may be practically approximated—notably via Monte Carlo methods—have received sub-
stantial attention (Anderson, 1990; Goodman, Tenenbaum, Feldman, & Griffiths, 2008;
Sanborn et al., 2010). We build on this previous work here. Secondly, WMC appears to
be positively associated with two distinct aspects of categorization: the ability to acquire
novel categories (i.e., category learning; Lewandowsky, 2011), and the ability to flexibly
switch between different categorization strategies (sometimes referred to as “knowledge
restructuring”; Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012). Previous work has explored how such
positive associations may arise in formal category learning models (Lewandowsky, 2011;
Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2011, 2012) but has treated these aspects of categorization sepa-
rately, and via different models and mechanisms; the possibility that WMC may influence
both category learning and knowledge restructuring via a single mechanism has not been
explored, and we seek such a common mechanism in the present article.
The key assumptions of the current work are that individuals approximate Bayesian
solutions to category learning problems by sampling from probability distributions (i.e.,
via Monte Carlo inference) and, more important, that an individual’s WMC directly trans-
lates into how many samples, or hypotheses, he or she is able to represent at one time.
We show that this simple equating of WMC with the number of active hypotheses allows
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us to reproduce the positive associations between WMC and both aspects of categoriza-
tion performance—category learning and knowledge restructuring—with a single mecha-
nism. Before describing the modeling approach and results in detail, we briefly
summarize the basic ideas behind Monte Carlo methods and the target experimental
results.
1.1. Monte Carlo as a psychological mechanism
In the Bayesian paradigm, background knowledge gives rise to a constrained set of
candidate hypotheses H for the true state of nature, and to associated degrees of belief P
(h) in each candidate in the set h 2 H. The sum of all beliefs about the true state of nat-
ure is fixed to 1. Such “prior” beliefs are updated in the light of observed data d to yield
“posterior” beliefs P(h|d) via Bayes’ theorem,
PðhjdÞ ¼ PðdjhÞPðhÞP
h02H
P djh0ð ÞP h0ð Þ ;
where the likelihood P(d|h) quantifies how expected the data are under each candidate
hypothesis.
As we will describe in detail below, for our purposes the state of nature is the true cat-
egory structure that participants are required to learn; the set of candidate hypotheses is
the space of all possible category structures that a participant is assumed to be able to
generate; and the observed data are the particular category instances presented to partici-
pants that they must categorize and for which they subsequently receive feedback about
the correct category label.
While Bayes’ theorem is simple to write down, it leads to complex practical issues
such as the source of the prior distribution, the choice of likelihood function, and how to
compute and summarize the posterior distribution if the hypothesis space H is very large
—such as when H is the space of all possible categories.
In Monte Carlo methods, the basic idea is to approximate the target distribution P(h|d)
by drawing samples from it. In other words, one represents P(h|d) with a set of samples
{h(i)}  P(h|d) from that distribution, each randomly selected with a frequency propor-
tional to its probability in the full distribution.
In the case where beliefs are updated sequentially as new information arrives—as in
the experiments we consider below, where participants receive feedback trial by trial—
one attempts to approximate a sequence of target distributions, and so we are more
specifically interested in the idea of sequential Monte Carlo, or “particle filtering” (Dou-
cet, de Freitas, & Gordon, 2001). As we will describe in more detail, one way of promot-
ing a good approximation to posterior distributions in this instance is to propose local
changes to a current hypothesis h, and to accept or reject the proposed variant h
0
as a
function of its posterior probability. This latter process can be thought of in terms of con-
tinuous exploration, or search, of the hypothesis space for regions of high probability.
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These two characteristics of Monte Carlo inference—representation by a limited num-
ber of hypotheses, and inference as involving an active process of exploration, or search,
of the posterior—draw parallels with working memory, which is typically characterized
not only as limited in capacity but also as active memory (Baddeley, 1992). In other
words, if WMC is the number of hypotheses that one can actively maintain and manipu-
late at a given time, and if these latter processes can be cast in terms of probabilistic
inference, then a possible analogy between working memory processes and Monte Carlo
inference presents itself.
Of course, the idea that sampling plays a role in psychological mechanisms has a long
tradition in psychology (Busemeyer, 1985; Estes, 1950; Restle, 1962; Stewart, Chater, &
Brown, 2006), though not typically in the context of approximating Bayesian inference.
More recent work has explicitly considered sample-based inference as a possible psycho-
logical mechanism (recent reviews include Griffiths et al., 2012; Suchow, Bourgin, &
Griffiths, 2017). For example, Vul and Pashler (2008) argued that the “wisdom of
crowds” effect, where the error of a judgment averaged over individuals is substantially
smaller than the average error of individual judgments, is consistent with individuals
using only a limited number of samples to form estimates (cf. Lewandowsky, Griffiths, &
Kalish, 2009). Other work has focused on apparent suboptimalities displayed in people’s
sensitivity to the ordering of information when they must update their beliefs over time.
Such order effects have been successfully captured by models employing sequential infer-
ence with limited samples in a variety of domains, including change detection (Brown &
Steyvers, 2009), garden path effects in sentence processing (Levy, Reali, & Griffiths,
2008), and category learning (Sanborn et al., 2010).
1.2. Working memory capacity and category learning
Despite the central importance of both working memory and categorization in cogni-
tion, until recently the relationship between these abilities received scant attention. The
nature of this relationship is of interest not only to provide further constraints on adequate
theories of these faculties, but also in light of recent arguments for the existence of multi-
ple categorization systems that rely to differing degrees on distinct memory systems. One
salient hypothesis is that category learning tasks that can be solved with relatively simple,
verbalizable rules (“rule-based” tasks) rely especially on working memory, while tasks
with solutions that generally defy description in terms of simple rules (“information-inte-
gration” tasks) do not (Ashby & Maddox, 2005, 2011; Ashby & O’Brien, 2005).
In contrast to this proposal, recent studies have found a positive association between
WMC and category learning performance, regardless of whether the categorization task is
rule-based (Lewandowsky, 2011) or based on information-integration (Lewandowsky
et al., 2012). Interestingly, WMC has also been found to be positively associated with a
somewhat distinct aspect of categorization, namely the ability to flexibly switch between
different categorization strategies (Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012)—a capacity that the
authors refer to as “knowledge restructuring.” These apparently disparate findings, which
we describe next, form the target of the current work.
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1.2.1. A positive association between WMC and category learning
Lewandowsky (2011) used a battery of four working memory tasks (memory updating,
operation span, sentence span, and spatial short-term memory tasks—refer to the original
paper for further detail and references) to measure the WMC of participants before testing
their category learning performance on the six classical problem types of Shepard, Hov-
land, and Jenkins (1961) (henceforth “SHJ”). Each problem type involves learning to
assign each of a set of eight stimuli to category A or B based on their values on three
binary dimensions (Fig. 1A); half of the stimuli are assigned to category A, and the other
half to category B. There are 72 possible assignments that satisfy these conditions, but
these reduce to six “types” assuming interchangeability of dimensions and labels
(Fig. 1B). The problem types vary with respect to the number of stimulus dimensions that
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Fig. 1. The six category learning problem types of Shepard et al. (1961). (A) Each one of eight stimuli is
defined by its unique combination of values on three dimensions (e.g., color, size, and shape) that correspond
to the edges of the cube. (B) In each problem type, four stimuli are assigned to category A (filled circles),
and the remaining four stimuli are assigned to category B (open circles). (C) Learning curves for each prob-
lem type, averaged over all participants, measured by Lewandowsky (data replotted from Lewandowsky,
2011). (D) Overall proportion of errors for high- and low-WMC participants (median split by WMC score)
for each problem type. Error bars represent +1 SE.
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are relevant for classification. For example, in a Type I problem, only a single dimension
is relevant; in a Type VI problem, by contrast, all three dimensions are relevant.
Consistent with the classical results, Lewandowsky found that the average trend of par-
ticipants was to learn a Type I problem fastest, a Type VI problem the slowest, with
Types II–V clustered in between (Fig. 1C). Crucially, structural equation modeling of
WMC and category learning measures also revealed that WMC was positively related to
category learning performance in each problem type (see Lewandowsky, 2011 for
details). In Fig. 1D, we replot the data to show the overall proportion of errors for each
problem type given the median split of participants into high- and low-WMC groups
based on their WMC scores. There is a clear trend for high-WMC participants to make
fewer errors on each type of problem. Entering errors into a 2 (WMC: low, high) 9 6
(Problem: I, II, III, IV, V, VI) 9 12 (Block: 1–12) repeated measures ANOVA confirmed
that high-WMC participants were more accurate than low-WMC participants (F(1,
111) = 13.63, p < .01), with no significant interactions between WMC and the other fac-
tors. Low-WMC participants made significantly more errors on each problem type, with
the exception of Type IV.
1.2.2. A positive association between WMC and knowledge restructuring
Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012) found that higher WMC (where WMC was assessed
using the same battery of measures as in Lewandowsky, 2011) was associated not only
with better category learning performance, consistent with the findings of Lewandowsky
(2011), but also with an improved ability to switch between categorization strategies
when instructed to do so—an ability assumed to reflect knowledge restructuring (Sewell
& Lewandowsky, 2011).
Like the SHJ problems, the basic task in the studies by Sewell and Lewandowsky
(2012) was to learn to assign stimuli to category A or B. Here, stimuli were rectangles
that varied with respect to three features (height, the position a vertical bar located along
their base, and color). Stimuli were assigned to category A or B depending on their posi-
tion in stimulus space (Fig. 2A). Height and bar offset were continuous dimensions,
whereas color could take only one of two values (e.g., blue or red). Training stimuli
(filled circles, Fig. 2A) were clustered into two separate regions of category space, with
categories arranged so that partial category boundaries (solid lines, Fig. 2A) could not be
integrated in a coherent manner—that is, neither partial boundary could be extended in a
way that allowed accurate classification of training stimuli in the other cluster, thereby
encouraging co-ordination of multiple partial rules (for fuller discussion, see Sewell &
Lewandowsky, 2012).
Importantly, equally good categorization performance in this task could be obtained by
learning any one of a number of different strategies. For example, a participant could use
the color of the rectangle to decide whether height (for blue rectangles) or bar position
(for red rectangles) predicted category A or B—this was named a knowledge-partitioning
(KP) strategy. Alternatively, a participant could attend to whether bar position was to the
left or right of center in order to then diagnose category membership based on either
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Fig. 2. Knowledge restructuring task of Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012). (A) Experimental stimuli. These
were rectangles (two examples shown at top) that varied with respect to their height, position of a vertically
oriented bar along their base, and color (e.g., blue or red). Stimuli were assigned to category A or B depend-
ing on their position in stimulus space. Filled circles denote training stimuli, open squares denote test stimuli,
and solid lines indicate the partial rule boundaries. (B) Ideal response profiles associated with the context-in-
sensitive (CI; top row) and knowledge-partitioning (KP; bottom row) categorization strategies. Shading indi-
cates the probability with which a test stimulus should be classified as belonging to category A (darker color
indicates a higher probability). Ideal performance in the different contexts (i.e., test stimulus presented in blue
or red) is shown in the left and right columns of panels, respectively. (C) Context sensitivity across all trans-
fer tests for knowledge-partitioning (KP)-first and context-insensitive (CI)-first conditions. Error bars indicate
1 SEM. (D) Mean absolute change in context sensitivity (CS) for participants with WMC scores in the top
and bottom quartiles (“High” and “Low” WMC, respectively) for Session 1 (i.e., between transfer tests 1 and
2) and Session 2 (i.e., between transfer tests 3 and 4). Error bars indicate +1 SE. Figures A–C after Sewell
and Lewandowsky (2012).
8 of 43 K. Lloyd et al. / Cognitive Science 43 (2019)
height or, again, bar position—thereby ignoring the color dimension entirely. This latter
was named a context-insensitive (CI) strategy.
The crucial experimental manipulation was to encourage a participant, using verbal
instruction, to first learn one of these two strategies—by hinting that the problem could
be solved using bar position (for a participant assigned to the “CI-first” experimental
group) or color (for a participant assigned to the “KP-first” experimental group)—before
giving the participant an unexpected instruction to switch to using the alternative strategy.
The degree to which participants’ predictions conformed to a CI or KP strategy could be
assessed via their generalization performance on a set of test stimuli (open squares,
Fig. 2A), since generalization performance should be either insensitive (CI strategy) or
sensitive (KP strategy) to the color of the presented stimuli (Fig. 2B). On the basis of
their generalization pattern, participants were assigned a “context sensitivity” score, sum-
marizing the degree to which their performance best conformed to a CI (context sensitiv-
ity close to 0) or KP (context sensitivity close to 1) strategy.
Regardless of whether participants were encouraged to use a CI or KP strategy in the
first instance, they were able to shift between strategies without any training on the novel
strategy (Fig. 2C), an ability assumed to reflect knowledge restructuring (Sewell &
Lewandowsky, 2011). More important for our purposes, however, was the finding of a
significant positive correlation between WMC and the extent of knowledge restructuring,
the latter being measured in terms of the absolute change in context sensitivity in each
test session (see Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012, for full details of the structural equa-
tion modeling approach and results). Fig. 2D shows the average change in context sensi-
tivity for participants with WMC scores in the top and bottom quartiles, for Session 1
(i.e., changes between transfer tests 1 and 2) and Session 2 (i.e., changes between transfer
tests 3 and 4). Entering these change scores into a 2 (WMC: low, high) 9 2 (Condition:
CI-first, KP-first) 9 2 (Session: 1, 2) repeated measures ANOVA confirmed a main effect
of WMC on change in context sensitivity (F(1, 47) = 4.42, p < .05). High-WMC partici-
pants had significantly higher changes in context sensitivity in Session 1 (t(48) = 2.81,
p < .01), though not in Session 2 (t(48) = 1.17, ns); we defer discussion of this, and fur-
ther subtleties of the experimental results, until later (see Section 4).
The results of Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012) thus suggest that WMC supports not
just standard category learning but also the flexible application of different categorization
strategies.
2. Modeling approach
The hypothesis of the current study was that by equating working memory capacity
(WMC) with the number of samples available for inference in a Bayesian category learn-
ing model, positive associations between WMC, category learning, and knowledge
restructuring would naturally arise, consistent with the experimental findings.
Our model can be described as comprising three parts: (a) a model of how participants
are assumed to represent categories, specified in terms of an explicit process whereby
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categories can be constructed (i.e., a “generative model”); (b) a procedure by which par-
ticipants are assumed to infer categories in light of their prior assumptions and the experi-
mental stimuli; and (c) a means for translating participants’ beliefs about categories into
choice, that is, a prediction of the category label associated with a stimulus before receiv-
ing feedback about the true label.
2.1. Category representation
Many representational formats for categories have been discussed in the literature,
including rules (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Goodman et al., 2008; Nosofsky, Pal-
meri, & McKinley, 1994), prototypes (Posner & Keele, 1968; Rosch, 1973), exemplars
(Kruschke, 1992; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986), or some mixture of these
(Anderson, 1991; Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Love, Medin, & Gur-
eckis, 2004). In the current work, we chose to work within the framework of classification
and regression tree (CART) models (Breiman, Friedman, Olshen, & Stone, 1984), which
can be considered a type of rule-based representation. This choice was largely pragmatic.
First, CART models offer an intuitive format for the categories used in the experimental
tasks of interest, which are readily described in terms of simple, verbalizable rules (i.e.,
“rule-based,” in the terms of Ashby & Maddox, 2005) and that also suggest an ordering on
rules (particularly the task of Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012; see below). Second, as we will
describe, these models are amenable to a Bayesian formulation (Chipman, George, &
McCulloch, 1998), which is obviously crucial for our purposes.
Most broadly, CART models (Breiman et al., 1984) provide a flexible method for
specifying the conditional distribution of a response variable (e.g., a category label) given
a collection of input predictors (e.g., stimulus features). In the experiments we consider,
category labels are always binary, y 2 {A, B}, and each stimulus to be categorized is rep-
resented by a p-dimensional feature vector x = (x1, x2, . . ., xp).
1 The models work by
recursively partitioning the input space into axis-aligned cuboids—imagine making a ser-
ies of axis-aligned “slices” through the input space—and applying a simple conditional
model to each region; the sequence of partitions on the input space can be represented as
a binary tree (Fig. 3A).
Formally, a binary tree structure > consists of a hierarchy of nodes g 2 >. Nodes with
children, or leaves, are referred to as internal nodes, while nodes without children are
referred to as leaf nodes (Fig. 3A, right). The set of internal nodes for > is denoted I>,
and the set of leaves is denoted L>. Each internal node g 2 I> has exactly two children,
called the left child gL and right child gR. Each node is associated with a block
BðgÞ  Rp of the input space as follows (cf. Fig. 3A, left): The root node is associated
with the entire input space, while each further internal node splits its block into two parts
by selecting a single dimension j(g) = {1, . . ., p} and location s(g) so that
BðgLÞ ¼ BðgÞ \ fx : xjðgÞ  sðgÞg and
BðgRÞ ¼ BðgÞ \ fx : xjðgÞ[ sðgÞg:
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Fig. 3. Representing categories with a classification tree. (A) Consider the stimulus space of Sewell and
Lewandowsky (2012), which comprises three stimulus dimensions (color, height, and bar position) and can
be represented as a cube (left). A single partition of this space into two subspaces can be achieved by select-
ing one of the stimulus dimensions (here, bar position) and splitting the space on that dimension at a particu-
lar location. This partitioning can be represented by a simple binary tree (right). The root node g (which is
also an “internal” node) is associated with the full stimulus space B(g). In this example, node g is split on
the dimension corresponding to bar position (j(g) = bar position) at a location s(g). This partitions the input
space into two blocks, B(gL) and B(gR), associated with the “leaf” nodes gL and gR. (B) Tree corresponding
to a knowledge-partitioning (KP) strategy; the initial split is on the color dimension. (C) Tree corresponding
to a context-insensitive (CI) strategy; the initial split is on the bar position dimension. (D) In the model, pro-
posed modifications to trees may be of three types, each involving the initial random selection of a node
(shaded red): grow selects a leaf node for expansion (i.e., splitting); prune selects an internal node and ren-
ders it a leaf node by deleting all nodes below it; and change selects an internal node and assigns it a new
rule (i.e., a splitting dimension and location).
K. Lloyd et al. / Cognitive Science 43 (2019) 11 of 43
The block of input space associated with a node g is determined by the ranges on each
dimension j that it covers, and we denote the corresponding range Rgj ¼ Rg;j ;Rg;þj
h i
. We
call the tuple T ¼ ð>; j; sÞ the decision tree.
In addition to a decision tree T with K leaf nodes, a CART model has a parameter
Θ = (h1, h2, . . ., hK), which associates parameter value hk with the kth leaf node. If a
stimulus x lies in the region of the kth leaf node, then y|x has distribution f(y|hk) for some
parametric family f. It is typically assumed that, conditional on ðH; T Þ, y values within a
leaf node are i.i.d., and furthermore, that y values across leaf nodes are independent.
Thus, letting nk denote the number of observations assigned to the kth leaf node and let-
ting yk,i denote the ith observation of y assigned to leaf k,
pðy1:njx1:n;H; T Þ ¼
YK
k¼1
Ynk
i¼1
f yk;ijhk
 
; ð1Þ
where n ¼PKk¼1 nk is the total number of observations. As we will make more precise
below, for us, the parameter hk is the probability that a stimulus within the kth leaf node
has category label A.
This provides a general framework for representing categories, but we require a more
detailed specification for the experiments of interest. We now do this for the categoriza-
tion task used by Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012), described above. The SHJ tasks
employed in Lewandowsky (2011) are simpler and are straightforwardly modeled with
only minor modifications.
In the Sewell–Lewandowsky task, the stimulus on each trial t comprised a three-
dimensional input xt ¼ ðxt;1 ¼ bar positiont 2 R, xt;2 ¼ heightt 2 Rþ, xt,3 = colort
2 {blue = 0, red = 1}).2 On training trials, participants made a category prediction before
observing the binary category label yt 2 {A, B}. The “ideal” knowledge-partitioning (KP)
and context-insensitive (CI) strategies which participants were encouraged to learn and
deploy can be naturally represented in tree form (Fig. 3B,C).
In the Bayesian framework, we need to specify some prior beliefs about the state of
nature. In the current case, the relevant prior beliefs concern category structure which, by
modeling assumption, can be formalized as a prior distribution on decision trees. Such a
prior can be imposed implicitly by specifying a stochastic process for generating such
trees. Following Chipman et al. (1998), we set the prior probability of a node g in tree
structure > being split into children nodes to be
pSPLITðg;>Þ ¼ að1þ dgÞb
; ð2Þ
where dg denotes the depth of the node (the depth of the root node is zero), and a < 1
and b ≥ 0 are parameters controlling expected tree size. Under this specification, the
probability pSPLIT is a decreasing function of node depth, and it decreases more steeply
for large b (cf. fig. 3 of Chipman et al., 1998). In all simulations, we fix a = 0.95 and
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b = 1, which gives a prior mean on the number of terminal nodes  3.7 (Chipman et al.,
1998), but results are essentially identical for other reasonable parameterizations.
In addition to a prior on tree structure > achieved through a prior on a node’s proba-
bility of splitting, we need to specify the prior probability of a node g splitting on each
stimulus dimension j(g) = {1, . . ., p} and location s(g). We generally assume that the
probability of splitting on each dimension is equal, that is,
pðjðgÞ ¼ jÞ ¼ 1=p; j ¼ 1; . . .; p: ð3Þ
Conditional on the choice of dimension, a split location is assumed to be drawn uni-
formly from the node’s range on the relevant dimension:
sðgÞjjðgÞ ¼ jU Rg;j ;Rg;þj
 
: ð4Þ
However, consideration of the information given to participants at the outset of Sewell
and Lewandowsky’s experiment leads us to a slightly different prior for the root node g0.
In particular, in the experiment, participants were initially told that stimulus color (KP-
first condition) or bar position (CI-first condition) reliably indicated whether height or bar
position was diagnostic of stimulus category. We assume that this information is reflected
in the prior probability of splitting the root node g0 on a particular dimension. Thus, we
introduce a “bias” parameter b to indicate that splits of the root node g0 on one dimen-
sion should be regarded as much more likely than on the others. Letting j∗ indicate the
dimension highlighted by instruction, we can write this prior probability as
pðjðg0ÞÞ ¼
b if jðg0Þ ¼ j;
1b
2
otherwise:

: ð5Þ
Setting b < 1, which would give nonzero probability to alternative splits at the root,
might reflect incomplete confidence in the experimenter’s instructions, for example.
In addition, participants were not only guided to a particular initial dimension—bar
position or color—but effectively also to an initial split location. Thus, in the KP-first
condition, attention was drawn to the color of the stimulus, while in the CI-first condition,
participants were explicitly told that the relevant feature was whether the bar was to the
left or right of center. We therefore assume that split locations for the highlighted dimen-
sion at the root node are known. Note that the question of split location is actually irrele-
vant in the case of the (binary) color dimension since all split locations on (0, 1) are
equivalent in terms of the resulting partition. However, this dimension can be treated as
continuous for ease of presentation and without consequence for modeling outcomes.
The preceding specifies a simple prior distribution on decision trees pðT Þ that can be
summarized as a process of deciding whether to split each node and, if so, selecting a
splitting dimension and location. To complete the model specification, we also require a
likelihood model pðy1:tjx1:t; T Þ that gives the conditional probabilities of stimulus labels
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given the tree structure. In this case, we simply assume that the kth leaf node has an asso-
ciated probability hk of generating label A,
pðytjhk; xtÞ ¼ hytk ð1 hkÞ1yt ; ð6Þ
and that this probability is an i.i.d. draw from a Beta distribution,
hk iid Betaða0; b0Þ: ð7Þ
Standard analytical simplification for this beta-binomial model yields the marginal likeli-
hood
pðy1:tjT ; x1:tÞ ¼ Cða0 þ b0ÞCða0ÞCðb0Þ
 KYK
k¼1
CðntkA þ a0ÞCðntk	  ntkA þ b0Þ
Cðntk	 þ a0 þ b0Þ
; ð8Þ
where ntkA and n
t
k	 are respectively the number of instances of category A and the total
number of data points in the partition of leaf k up to trial t. Note that for a given tree,
this likelihood is higher for leaves assigned observations with homogeneous labels (i.e.,
with labels that are either mostly A or mostly B). These are exactly the partitions that
constitute “good” solutions to the categorization problem.
2.2. Inference
Given the model specified above, we assume that participants seek to represent the
sequence of posterior distributions over possible trees fpðT jx1:t; y1:tÞgTt¼1 as they succes-
sively predict and receive information about stimulus labels over trials. Generally, a brute
force procedure of enumerating all possible trees, a space which dramatically increases in
size with t, is not a plausible model of how participants perform inference. Instead, we
assume that people’s beliefs are represented by a relatively small number of samples from
these posterior distributions which can be updated over time. In other words, we model
participants as performing particle filtering (Daw & Courville, 2008; Doucet et al., 2001;
Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2006).
As mentioned above, two aspects of the inference process which we now describe
draw parallels with working memory. First, similar to the idea that there is a limit on the
number of items that can be held in working memory (Cowan, 2001), we assume there is
a bounded number of hypotheses about category structure—in this case, the samples/par-
ticles which correspond to particular tree structures—that can be entertained at a given
time. Second, similar to the notion that working memory is active (Baddeley, 1992),
involving the manipulation rather than merely passive storage of items, we assume that
inference involves a continuing process whereby local transformations to current hypothe-
ses are proposed, and which may be accepted or rejected. The latter process promotes
diversity in the hypothesis set and continuous exploration of the hypothesis space.
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In detail, we assume that on a given trial t, a participant’s beliefs are represented by a
small set of L possible trees fT ðlÞgLl¼1 with associated weights fwðlÞt gLl¼1 proportional to
their posterior probability. This set of trees constitutes the limited set of hypotheses puta-
tively maintained in a working memory of capacity L. With the observation of the stimu-
lus and category label on the next trial t + 1, a proper reweighting of the lth tree is given
by the following update (Chopin, 2002):
w
ðlÞ
tþ1 / wðlÞt
pðT ðlÞjx1:tþ1; y1:tþ1Þ
pðT ðlÞjx1:t; y1:tÞ
/ wðlÞt
pðy1:tþ1jT ðlÞ; x1:tþ1Þ
pðy1:tjT ðlÞ; x1:tÞ
¼ wðlÞt pðytþ1jT ðlÞ; xtþ1; y1:tÞ:
ð9Þ
As standard within-particle filtering methods (Doucet et al., 2001), this reweighting
process can be alternated with a resampling stage in which very unlikely trees, that is,
those with very low weights, are discarded to be replaced by replicates of more probable
trees. A simple way of doing this is to sample L times with replacement from the set
{T(l)} with probabilities proportional to the updated weights fwðlÞtþ1gLl¼1 (Gordon, Salmond,
& Smith, 1993).
Additionally, this resampled particle set can then be “rejuvenated” (Chopin, 2002;
Gilks & Berzuini, 2001), reintroducing diversity and allowing continuous exploration
of alternative solutions. This is the “active” step which, we suggest, recalls concep-
tions of working memory as involving active manipulation of currently stored items.
Specifically, we may, without altering the targeted posterior distribution of interest,
propose transformations of trees from a Markov chain transition kernel qtþ1ð	jT ðlÞÞ
and accept or reject these proposals such that we retain the appropriate stationary dis-
tribution pðT jx1:tþ1; y1:tþ1Þ. Closely following the transition kernel suggested by Chip-
man et al. (1998), we consider the scheme where for each tree fT ðlÞg, a new tree
T ðlÞ is proposed by randomly choosing among three possible transformations
(Fig. 3D):
1. GROW: Randomly select a leaf node, then draw a splitting dimension and location
from the prior (Eqs. 3 and 4). Not permitted if the split leads to an empty node (i.e.,
a partition with no assigned data points).
2. PRUNE: Randomly select an internal node, then turn it into a leaf node by deleting
all nodes below it. Not permitted if the tree comprises only the root node.
3. CHANGE: Randomly select an internal node, then randomly reassign it a splitting
dimension and location by a draw from the prior. Not permitted if the reassigned
split is inconsistent with splits of nodes below the selected node.
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This proposed tree T ðlÞ is then accepted with probability
aðT ðlÞ; T ðlÞÞ ¼ min 1; pðT
ðlÞjx1:tþ1; y1:tþ1Þ=qtþ1ðT ðlÞT ðlÞÞ
pðT ðlÞx1:tþ1; y1:tþ1Þ=qtþ1ðT ðlÞjT ðlÞÞ
( )
; ð10Þ
as per the standard Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin,
2004). This simple “resample-move” algorithm (Chopin, 2002; Gilks & Berzuini, 2001)
is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Why might the number of samples/particles be expected to influence category learn-
ing? The basic intuition comes from viewing the category learning process as one of
search (Fig. 4). In particular, “good” category structures are those that partition stimuli
into regions with homogeneous labels (A or B), and these are the category structures that
have high posterior probability. In the sample-based inference procedure we consider, the
population of particles will seek out regions of high posterior probability, and the rate at
which these regions are found may plausibly depend on the number of particles.
So far, we have suggested a particle filtering scheme for representing a sequence of
posterior distributions over category structures, where that structure is assumed to be
specified by a classification tree. However, we have not yet addressed the issue of strat-
egy switching. Thus, in the Sewell–Lewandowsky experiment, participants were able to
immediately switch between different categorization strategies when instructed to do so,
and in the absence of further training.
We model such switches as a simple reweighting operation on the set of trees. Take the
specific example where a participant has initially been encouraged to use the CI strategy
and after t training sessions has in mind the set of weighted trees fT ðlÞ;wðlÞt gLl¼1 approximat-
ing the target distribution under the prior appropriate to the CI strategy. We denote this tar-
get distribution pCIðT jx1:t; y1:tÞ. The experimenter then instructs the participant to change to
using the KP strategy. Assuming that the set of trees remains fixed, the associated tree
weights now need to be changed to reflect the new target distribution pKPðT jx1:t; y1:tÞ. This
can be achieved by an importance weighting step, treating pCIðT jx1:t; y1:tÞ as the importance
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distribution. In particular, denoting a particle’s weight before and after the instruction to
switch as w
ðlÞ
t and w
ðlÞþ
t , respectively, the relevant reweighting is as follows:
w
ðlÞþ
t / wðlÞt
pKPðT ðlÞjx1:t; y1:tÞ
pCIðT ðlÞjx1:t; y1:tÞ
; ð11Þ
which, under the specified model, becomes particularly simple:
w
ðlÞþ
t /
w
ðlÞ
t 
 1b2
 
=b if jðg0Þ ¼ bar position;
w
ðlÞ
t if jðg0Þ ¼ height;
w
ðlÞ
t 
 b= 1b2
 
if jðg0Þ ¼ color:
8><
>: ð12Þ
To switch in the reverse direction—from the KP to CI strategy—the appropriate
reweighting involves the ratio pCIðT ðlÞjx1:t; y1:tÞ=pKPðT ðlÞjx1:t; y1:tÞ, with the appropriate
alterations made to Eq. 12.
Again, why might a greater number of particles improve ability to switch between strate-
gies? Consider the cartoon example in Fig. 5A, depicting the posterior probability P(h|D) of
different possible category structures h 2 H given a stimulus set D. In this example, two
particular category structures, h1 and h2, are most probable, and equally so, and we can think
of these as being two equally valid categorization strategies, as in the Sewell–Lewandowsky
task. Again, this probability distribution will be represented by a set of particles with loca-
tions (i.e., particular category structures) drawn from this distribution, along with corre-
sponding weights that are proportional to the posterior probabilities of those locations.
Now assume that the effect of an instruction to use a particular strategy is to increase
the posterior probability of category structures that accord with that strategy, in this case
h
p
(h
|D
)
h
Fig. 4. Category learning as search. In the formulation here, category learning is conceptualized as a process of
search for category structures h 2 H that have a high posterior probability, p(h|D), given both the prior distribu-
tion on category structures and the observed data, D. In the sample-based inference procedure considered, this
search is enacted by a particle set (black circles) whose positions may be changed through the acceptance of pro-
posed local changes to the corresponding category structure. Proposals that result in a category structure with
higher posterior probability (arrows) will be accepted more often. With a larger number of particles (right), this
search may be more efficient, in that high probability structures will be discovered more quickly.
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those in the region of h1 (Fig. 5B). Such a change in posterior distribution, driven by the
different priors underlying the distinct strategies, is exactly what we assumed when sug-
gesting that strategy-switching is mediated by a reweighting of particles (see above).
Depending on the number of particles available, how well this collection of particles rep-
resents the true posterior distribution—especially in regions of lower probability—may
differ. With a sufficiently large number of particles, at least some particles should be allo-
cated to regions of lower probability, such as around h2 (Fig. 5B, upper). However, with
a decreasing number of particles, representation of the posterior distribution may become
impoverished to the extent that such regions of low probability may not contain any parti-
cles at all (Fig. 5B, lower). In other words, the shift in “mental set” associated with a
switch in categorization strategy is here implemented by a change in posterior
p
(h
|D
)
h1 h2
h1 h2
h1 h2
h1 h2
h1 h2
“switch”
many particles
few particles
(A) (B) (C)
Fig. 5. Particle diversity and flexibility of behavior. Cartoon of how different numbers of particles affect the
model’s ability to switch between different categorization strategies. (A) Given the observed data D, comprising
a set of stimuli and their category labels, there is a posterior distribution P(h|D) over the set of possible category
structures h 2 H. Here, two particular category structures h1 and h2 are equally probable, and can be considered
as two equally valid categorization strategies. The distribution can be approximated by a set of particles, where
each particle has a particular location (circles), corresponding to a category structure h, and a weight, which is
proportional to the posterior probability (vertical, dashed lines). (B) The instruction to use a particular strategy is
conceptualized as biasing the posterior distribution so that particular category structures are more probable, in
this case category structures in the region of h1. Whether regions of lower probability are represented in the
approximation depends on the number of particles: If there are many particles, some are likely to be located in
regions of lower probability, such as around h2 (upper); if there are fewer particles, there may be no particles in
this region (lower). (C) The instruction to switch strategy is conceptualized as leading to a change in the poste-
rior distribution, and a corresponding change in the particle weights (upper); however, in the case of fewer parti-
cles, there may be no particles immediately available to represent the change in distribution (lower).
18 of 43 K. Lloyd et al. / Cognitive Science 43 (2019)
distribution; the participant’s immediate ability to represent this change is assumed to
depend in some sense on the diversity of the current hypothesis set.
The possible relevance to knowledge restructuring is what these different degrees of
approximation to the true posterior may entail when instructed to switch categorization
strategy. Intuitively, if fewer resources have been devoted to representing alternative
strategies in the first place, however unlikely, then it may be more difficult to entertain
these alternatives when instructed to do so. In our particular formulation of the switching
process, we considered a simple formulation in which the immediate effect of an instruc-
tion to switch strategy is that the locations of the particles remain the same, but the rela-
tive weightings of particles are updated according to the new posterior distribution
(Fig. 5C). In particular, if there are particles located in the region of h2, these will imme-
diately be updated (Fig. 5C, upper), and the new categorization strategy can be immedi-
ately deployed. By contrast, if there are no particles located in the region of h2, no up-
weighting can occur and the alternative strategy is initially unavailable (Fig. 5C, lower).
2.3. Choice
We have so far described a process for performing inference (i.e., particle filtering)
under an assumed generative model for the structure of categories (i.e., CART). What is
still missing is a model of how participants finally generate a guess about a stimulus’s
category label before they receive feedback in the form of the true label. We consider
two possible choice rules: one in which a participant chooses the category label with the
highest probability (“maximum-probability rule”), and another in which a participant
chooses a category label stochastically in accord with their probabilities (“probability-
matching rule”). Since there is no explore-exploit dilemma in the categorization tasks we
consider—full information about the correct label is always received, regardless of choice
—participants should always select the label they think is most likely (i.e., maximum-
probability rule). On the other hand, given that probability-matching behavior has some-
times been observed in this domain (e.g., Estes, Campbell, Hatsopoulos, & Hurwitz,
1989; Gluck & Bower, 1988), we considered it possible that participants also used this
strategy, despite it being suboptimal in the tasks considered.
From the above, a sample-based approximation to the predictive probability that a
stimulus xt+1 has label yt+1 = A is given by
pðytþ1 ¼ Ajx1:tþ1; y1:tÞ ¼
X
T
pðytþ1 ¼ Ajx1:tþ1; y1:t; T ÞpðT jx1:t; y1:tÞ
 1
L
XL
l¼1
pðytþ1 ¼ Ajx1:tþ1; y1:t; T ðlÞÞ
¼ 1
L
XL
l¼1
Ehkjx1:tþ1;y1:t;T ðlÞ ½hk;
ð13Þ
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noting that
pðytþ1 ¼ Ajx1:tþ1; y1:t; T ðlÞÞ ¼
Z
pðytþ1 ¼ Ajx1:tþ1; y1:t; hk; T ðlÞÞpðhkjx1:tþ1; y1:t; T ðlÞÞdhk
¼
Z
hk pðhkjx1:tþ1; y1:t; T ðlÞÞdhk
¼ Ehkjx1:tþ1;y1:t;T ðlÞ ½hk:
Equation 13 simply says that an approximation to the predictive probability in this case
is given by an unweighted average of posterior means for hk, where k for the lth particle
is the index of the leaf node relevant to the input xt+1 in T ðlÞ. For the leaf model used in
the current case, the posterior mean is given by
Ehkjx1:tþ1;y1:t;T ðlÞ ½hk ¼
ntkA þ a0
ntk	 þ a0 þ b0
; ð14Þ
where, again, ntkA and n
t
k	 are, respectively, the number of instances of category A and the
total number of data points in the partition of leaf k up to trial t. The deterministic maxi-
mum-probability rule would choose the category label with the highest predictive proba-
bility, but more generally we consider the -greedy form
Ptþ1ðAÞ ¼ ð1 Þ1~pðytþ1¼AÞ[ ~pðytþ1¼BÞ þ 0:5; ð15Þ
where Pt+1(A) is the probability of guessing category A on trial (t + 1), ~pðytþ1Þ is short-
hand for the sample-based approximation given in Eq. 13,  is the probability of guessing
a category label according to the ﬂip of a fair coin, and 1	 is the indicator function. In
other words: choose the most probable label with probability (1  ), or with probability 
simply ﬂip a coin. When  = 0, we recover the deterministic case.
The probability-matching rule takes the slightly different form
Ptþ1ðAÞ ¼ ð1 Þ~pðytþ1 ¼ AÞ þ 0:5; ð16Þ
so that the probability of guessing a category label is a linear combination of its predic-
tive probability ~pðytþ1Þ (again, using shorthand for the probability given in Eq. 13) and
the guessing rate ; strict probability-matching is obtained when  = 0.
Given that sample-based inference will itself tend to introduce stochasticity, we should
comment on the addition of a guessing rate , which, for  > 0, will provide an additional
source of variability. Brieﬂy, our motivation was simply the (common) observation that
model ﬁt was improved by including this parameter; the behavior of participants tended to
exhibit levels of variability beyond what our model would generate with  = 0, even with
a single particle. As such,  captures our ignorance about such variability, which may arise
from sources distinct from sample-based inference (e.g., lapses in attention, lack of
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motivation, etc.). Of course, the price to be paid for this improvement in ﬁt, as we will
see below, is that apportioning responsibility for behavioral variability to different compo-
nents of the model—inference versus choice—becomes all the more difﬁcult.
2.4. Model-fitting and analysis
Models of varying degrees of complexity were fit to the data by finding the combina-
tion of the parameters of our category-learning model (described above) that maximized
the likelihood of the observed sequence of category predictions. Models varied in the
number of parameters to be fit, lying on a spectrum from the simplest case, which
required that all participants be fit by a single set of parameters, to the most complex
case, in which each participant was fit with a separate set of parameters. Formally, denot-
ing an observed sequence of predictions over T trials by c1:T and the full set of parame-
ters by Φ = {L, b, a, b, a0, b0, } (see Table 1), the general aim was to ﬁnd the (free)
parameters Φ that maximized the probability
pðc1:T jU; x1:T ; y1:T1Þ ¼
YT
t¼1
pðctjU; x1:t; y1:t1Þ; ð17Þ
with the trial-by-trial probabilities extracted from Eq. 15 or Eq. 16, as appropriate.
Best-fit parameters for a given model were defined as those maximizing the average
likelihood in a grid search. The grid was defined as follows: number of particles L loga-
rithmically spaced on the interval [1, 100], yielding 34 values; guessing rate uni-
formly spaced  2 (0, 0.02, 0.04, . . ., 0.2); and shape a0 2 (0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1). In the
knowledge restructuring case, we also included three possible values of bias,
b 2 {0.5, 0.75, 0.9}. The grid values were chosen to reﬂect our a priori assumptions about
plausible parameter values. That is, we expected participants to be more plausibly modeled
as instantiating relatively few particles (hence the logarithmic scale), and as expressing
noise levels in the lower range (hence the upper limit of 0.2 on the guessing rate ). The
choice of comparatively ﬁnely spaced  values was motivated by the expectation that L
and  would at least partly trade off with each other, so effort was made to make the reso-
lution of these parameters comparable in order to minimize the possibility of bias. In addi-
tion, we included the case where the number of particles was set to a much larger number
Table 1
Model parameters
Parameters
Fixed Free
a = 0.95 L: number of particles
b = 1 b: bias
b0 = a0 a0: Beta shape parameter
: random guessing rate
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(L = 10,000); this was to provide a comparison model that approximated the full posterior
distribution much more closely than when the number of particles was more restricted.
Since the estimate of the likelihood was generally less reliable with fewer particles
(due to greater variability in the algorithm’s behavior), the number of simulation runs
was chosen so that an “effective” number of particles would be constant, thereby facilitat-
ing a fair comparison between the fits of different numbers of particles. We set the effec-
tive number of particles to 1,000, so that the number of simulation runs was determined
by rounding to the nearest integer the result of 1,000/L (i.e., the 1-particle case was run
1,000 times, the 100-particle case was run 10 times, etc.).
As mentioned in Section 2.3, we additionally compared two different choice models.
Modulo the effect of the guessing rate , either a stimulus was deterministically assigned
to the most likely category (maximum-probability choice rule), or it was probabilistically
assigned to a category in proportion to that category’s predictive probability (probability-
matching choice rule).
In evaluating the fit of different models, we used the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) to select the best-fitting model (Schwarz, 1978). That is, we chose the model M for
which the quantity BIC   log P DjM; U^M
  þ 1
2
k logðnÞ was minimized, where
PðDjM; U^MÞ is the value of the likelihood function (see above) given the maximum likeli-
hood estimate U^M of the model parameters, k is the number of estimated parameters in
the model, and n is the number of data points (i.e., the number of trials). The BIC pro-
vides a simple yet principled (via its approximation of the Bayes factor) approach to
model comparison (for more details, see, for example, Kass & Raftery, 1995).
To assess relationships between best-fitting model parameters and participants’ WMC
scores, we used two methods. The first was simply to measure the correlation between
parameters and WMC scores, and determine whether the correlation was significantly dif-
ferent from zero. While this method has the advantage of being straightforward, the
strength of the correlation can be reduced both by imprecision in the estimates of the
best-fitting model parameters and tradeoffs between parameters in fitting the data. While
these issues cannot be entirely avoided, we developed a second measure to mitigate them
that involved estimating a function that mapped WMC scores to a particular parameter of
interest as part of the fitting procedure. To do so, we again used BIC scores to compare
slope-intercept models (in which the parameter of interest was a linear function of the
individual WMC scores) against intercept-only models (in which the parameter was fixed
across participants and thus did not depend on WMC scores). In cases in which there is a
relationship between a parameter and WMC score, the slope-intercept model should per-
form better, since the slope helps to capture that relationship. Our second measure helps
address imprecision in estimating parameters because the parameters fit in the slope-inter-
cept model are the best-fitting values that are consistent with a relationship with WMC,
so if the individual parameters are somewhat imprecise but still consistent with a relation-
ship to WMC, then the slope-intercept model would still perform best. Additionally,
because of the concern about parameter tradeoffs in fitting the data, we allowed the other
parameters in both the slope-intercept and intercept-only models to freely vary, so that
these other parameters could trade off against the linear relationship between the
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parameter of interest and WMC in the way that allowed the best fit to the data. When
comparing details of model fit with a participant’s WMC score, we always used for the
latter the average of that participant’s scores over the battery of working memory tasks
used in Lewandowsky (2011) and Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012).
3. Results
3.1. Category learning
3.1.1. Simulations
Both Lewandowsky (2011) and Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012) found that working
memory capacity (WMC) was positively correlated with category learning performance,
such that participants with higher WMC tended to make fewer categorization errors. We
hypothesized that a greater number of particles would have a similar effect because, on
average, one might expect the search for a “good” (i.e., more probable) category structure
to progress faster, and with less chance of getting stuck at local maxima, with a higher
number of particles (Fig. 4). Here, we focus on simulating the classical SHJ tasks used
by Lewandowsky (2011). Since we always found that the probability-matching choice
rule yielded better fits to the data than the maximum-probability rule (see Table 2 below),
the simulation results always reflect use of the former.
Fig. 6A shows the overall average error rate for simulations as the number of particles
is increased from 1 to 20 while keeping other parameter values fixed (a0 = 1,  = 0);
each data point represents 113 simulation runs, where each simulation run uses a stimulus
sequence of 192 trials observed by one of the 113 participants in Lewandowsky (2011).
For each problem type, increasing the number of particles does indeed lead to a decrease
in the average proportion of errors, though the size of this effect is rather modest and
quickly asymptotes (note that the x-axis here indicates the number of particles—not block
number, as in Fig. 1C).
Note that even without attempting to fit the parameters of the model, the ordering of
error rates produced by the model for the different problem types conforms to the basic
SHJ pattern of results—Type I easiest and Type VI hardest, with Types II–V clustered in
between. Briefly, this is because of the so-called automatic Occam’s razor, which refers
to a preference for simpler, or more parsimonious, hypotheses, and which arises naturally
within the Bayesian framework (Goodman et al., 2008; MacKay, 2003).
It is also interesting to note that the difference in the simulated error rates between the
Type II problem and, for example, Type IV increases—up to a point—as the number of
particles grows. An advantage in learning Type II relative to Type IV problems has been
reported in the experimental literature (e.g., Nosofsky, Gluck, Palmeri, McKinley, &
Glauthier, 1994; Shepard et al., 1961), though this has not always been found, as in
Lewandowsky (2011) (cf. Kurtz, Levering, Stanton, Romero, & Morris, 2013). Given our
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basic hypothesis that WMC reflects number of particles, this simulation result prompts
the question of whether Type II advantage depends on WMC.
To investigate this further, we revisited the data of Lewandowsky (2011), splitting par-
ticipants into low- and high-WMC groups according to a median split of WMC scores
and entering blockwise error rates into a 2 (WMC: low, high) 9 2 (Problem: II,
IV) 9 12 (Block: 1–12) repeated measures ANOVA. In addition to a main effect of WMC
(F(1, 111) = 7.65, p < .01), we found a significant three-way interaction between
WMC*Problem*Block (F(11, 1221) = 2.19, p = .01). High-WMC participants performed
significantly better in terms of proportion correct on Type II (M = 0.92, SD = 0.10) than
on Type IV (M = 0.88, SD = 0.11; t(56) = 2.19, p = .02), while low-WMC participants
did not perform significantly differently on these two problem types (Type II: M = 0.85,
SD = 0.14; Type IV: M = 0.85, SD = 0.14, t(55) = 0.06, n.s.). Learning curves are shown
in the Appendix (Fig. S1). This result is consistent with our basic hypothesis, as we
expect a Type II advantage to appear, or become stronger, with more particles (i.e.,
higher WMC).
The effect of a larger number of particles across problem types is further illustrated in
Fig. 6B, where we compare the overall error proportions for the extreme case of 1 parti-
cle vs. 100 particles. A larger number of particles reduces the error rate for each problem
type, and in a manner that qualitatively resembles that observed in the experimental data
when participants are grouped according to WMC score (cf. Fig. 1D). Indeed, a rank-
ordering of problem types by the extent to which performance is better for higher WMC/
particles revealed a significant positive correlation (Spearman’s rank-order correlation
rs(4) = .94, p < .05). In other words, the problem types that show greatest difference
between high- and low-WMC participants tend also to be those where an increased num-
ber of particles also makes the most difference (from greatest to smallest advantage, the
Table 2
Model comparison, SHJ tasks
Model No. Free Parameters NLL BIC
1 3 40,801 (45,411) 40,819 (45,429)
2 18 39,669 (44,131) 39,775 (44,237)
3 115 40,664 (45,251) 41,342 (45,928)
4 115 38,569 (41,119) 39,246 (41,796)
5 115 39,336 (45,171) 40,013 (45,848)
6 339 37,649 (40,827) 39,645 (42,824)
7 2,034 34,284 (34,915) 46,261 (46,892)
Notes.We compared model fit under different constraints of the number of parameters. Model 1: single set of
parameters {L, a0, } ﬁxed across all participants and problem types. Model 2: single set of parameters per prob-
lem type, ﬁxed across participants. Model 3: different number of particles L per participant, ﬁxed across problems,
with {a0, } ﬁxed across participants. Model 4: different guessing rate  per participant, ﬁxed across problems,
with {L, a0} ﬁxed across participants. Model 5: different shape a0 per participant, ﬁxed across problems, with
{L, } ﬁxed across participants. Model 6: single set of parameters per participant, ﬁxed across problem types.
Model 7: single set of parameters per participant-problem type. Values for the maximum-probability choice rule
are shown in parentheses. BIC, Bayesian information criterion; NLL, negative log likelihood.
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experimental pattern follows the order VI, II, III, I, V, IV; our simulations follow the
order VI, II, III, V, I, IV).
We also examined the effect on performance of varying the other free parameters (i.e.,
guessing rate  and shape a0). Fig. 6C shows, unsurprisingly, that the proportion of errors
decreases linearly as  decreases. Since this rate of decrease is essentially uniform across
problem types, the amount of improvement in each problem type is roughly the same
(Fig. 6D). A simple inverse association between WMC and guessing rate therefore fails to
capture differential effects of WMC on performance of the problem types (Spearman’s
rank-order correlation rs(4) = .37, p = .50, n.s.).
Decreasing a0 generally leads to a lower error rate—recall that a higher a0 entails a
higher tolerance for “mixed” categories (i.e., instances of both A and B; cf. Section 2.1)—
with Problem Type VI proving a notable exception (Fig. 6E,F). Briefly, what happens in the
latter case is that the model becomes increasingly intolerant of the intermediate tree manipu-
lations necessary to reach a more satisfactory solution; this can be observed, for example, in
the decreasing average number of nodes in the final tree as a0 is decreased (Fig. 6E). A sim-
ple inverse association between WMC and shape therefore does a worse job compared to
particles at capturing differential effects of WMC on performance of the different problem
types (Spearman’s rank-order correlation, rs(4) = .83, p = .06, n.s.).
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Fig. 6. Effect of model parameters on category learning in the SHJ problems. Overall proportion of errors
(i.e., averaged across blocks) for each problem type as each parameter is varied. (A; B) Number of particles
L; other parameters fixed a0 = 1,  = 0. (C; D) Noise ; other parameters ﬁxed a0 = 1, L = 1. (E; F) Shape
a0; other parameters ﬁxed L = 1,  = 0. Numbers in (E) for Problem VI indicate the average number of nodes
in the ﬁnal classiﬁcation tree. Each data point represents an average of 113 simulation runs; error bars in lower
panels indicate +1 SD. Note the reversed x-axes for C and E.
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3.1.2. Model-fitting
In fitting model parameters, we compared a number of possibilities ranging from the
case where all participants were constrained to share a single set of parameters (Model 1;
least flexible) to the case where each participant was free to have a different set of
parameters for each problem type (Model 7; most flexible). Models of intermediate com-
plexity included the cases where two of the three free parameters {L, a0, } were ﬁxed
across subjects, while the other free parameter was allowed to vary between subjects
(Model 3: vary L; Model 4: vary ; Model 5: vary a0). Since the probability-matching
choice rule always ﬁt better than the maximum-probability choice rule (compare numbers
without and with parentheses, respectively, in Table 2), we restrict our attention to the
results of the former case.
In terms of BIC, the model in which the number of particles L and shape a0 were fixed
across subjects, while guessing rate  was allowed to vary between participants (i.e.,
Model 4), was found to ﬁt best (Table 2). By contrast, ﬁt for the model in which the num-
ber of particles L was allowed to vary between participants, with a0 and  ﬁxed (Model
3), was comparatively poor. The comparison model—with a large number (10,000) of par-
ticles—resulted in poorer ﬁt both when we allowed shape a0 and noise  to vary between
subjects (NLL = 41,624, BIC = 42,955), and when only noise was allowed to vary
between subjects (NLL= 42,469, BIC= 43,141). The probability-matching choice rule
yielded a better ﬁt than the maximum-probability choice rule in all models.
The upper panels of Fig. 7 display the blockwise average learning curves resulting
from respectively simulating from Model 3 (vary particles), Model 4 (vary noise), and
Model 5 (vary shape) using the best-fit parameters for each. All models produce similar
behavior on average, recapitulating the ordering of problem types in the experimental
data and the qualitative character of the learning curves (cf. Fig. 1C).
The lower panels of Fig. 7 plot each participant’s average WMC against their best-fit
parameters for each model. When only the number of particles L was allowed to vary
between participants (Model 3), WMC and L were positively correlated
(r = .30, p < .01), which was consistent with our initial hypothesis. Best-fit values of the
other parameters (fixed across subjects) were a0 = 0.5 and  = 0.04. However, this model
was not found to ﬁt the data best. Furthermore, assuming that a participant’s best-ﬁt num-
ber of particles is a (linear) function of WMC, we found that an intercept-only model
(NLL = 37,823, BIC = 39,160), with best-ﬁt intercept set to L = 1, ﬁt these data better
than a slope-intercept model relating these variables (NLL = 37,823, BIC = 39,166),
allowing the other parameters (a0 and ) to vary freely in both cases.
The best-fitting model allowed the guessing rate  to vary between participants, while
ﬁxing the remaining parameters across participants (Model 4). In this case,  was found to
be negatively correlated with our aggregate WMC measure (r = .30, p < .01), suggest-
ing that high-WMC participants tended to be less “noisy” in their choices. Best-ﬁt values
of the remaining parameters, ﬁxed across subjects, were a0 = 0.5 and L = 1. Furthermore,
we found that a slope-intercept model (NLL = 38,740, BIC = 40,083) ﬁt these data better
than an intercept-only model (NLL = 39,188, BIC = 40,525). The best-ﬁt slope was
b1 = 0.6, supporting an inverse relationship between WMC and variability in behavior.
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In the model in which only shape a0 was allowed to vary between participants (Model
5), WMC and a0 were also significantly negatively correlated (r = .35, p < .01). Best-
fit values of the other parameters (fixed across subjects) were L = 1 and  = 0.03. Here, a
slope-intercept model (NLL = 38,329, BIC = 39,671) ﬁt better than an intercept-only
model (NLL = 39,147, BIC = 40,484), with best-ﬁt slope b1 = 0.7.
While model comparison did not support a model allowing a unique set of parameters
(L, a0, ) for each participant (Model 6), this was the second-best ﬁtting model and it was
of interest to examine how the free parameters might trade off against each other. The only
signiﬁcant correlations found were a negative correlation between best-ﬁt shape and num-
ber of particles (r = .28, p < .01), and a positive correlation between shape and guess
rate (r = .19, p < .05).
3.2. Knowledge restructuring
3.2.1. Simulations
Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012) found a positive association between WMC and
knowledge restructuring, as measured by an individual’s ability to switch between differ-
ent categorization strategies. We hypothesized that a greater number of particles would
also give rise to this effect since a greater diversity of hypotheses could be represented,
leading to an enhanced ability to flexibly shift between representations with changes in
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task demands (Fig. 5). As for our simulations of model performance in the SHJ task, we
report results in which the probability-matching choice rule is used, since it always
yielded better fits to the data (see Table 3 below).
Fig. 8 shows the effect of varying the number of particles L on the degree of context sen-
sitivity (CS) change between test sessions (all other model parameters were kept fixed:
b = 0.9, a0 = 1,  = 0). Averaging over simulation runs, we observe that the extent of CS-
change increases gradually with the number of particles, regardless of whether the model ini-
tially learns a context-insensitive (CI; Fig. 8A, left) or knowledge-partitioning (KP; Fig. 8A,
right) strategy. This graded effect predominantly reﬂects the effect of averaging over CS
changes which are of “all or none” character—switch or no switch—where the probability of
switching increases with the number of particles (Fig. 8B). Interestingly, the empirical CS-
change scores also display some degree of bimodality, though this is not to the same extent,
nor does the degree of bimodality notably differ between high- and low-WMC participants
(see Appendix, Fig. S2A). Analogous to the increase in successful switching that we observe
in simulations, it is also the case that participants’ probability of making a successful switch
(deﬁned as for simulations, that is, a change in CS between test sessions that crosses 0.5)
increases on average with higher WMC (see Appendix, Fig. S2B).
3.2.2. Model-fitting
As for the SHJ tasks, we fit models of different complexity to the data. In the knowl-
edge restructuring task, we found that allowing each participant to have their own set of
parameters fit the data better in terms of BIC than simpler, less flexible models (Table 3).
As in the SHJ case, the comparison model, with L = 10,000 particles, always resulted in
a poorer fit, and the probability-matching choice rule yielded a better fit than the maxi-
mum-probability choice rule in all models (Table 3).
Fig. 9A–C show aspects of behavior of the best model using the best-fitting parameters
for each participant. Fig. 9A shows that the average changes in context sensitivity
Table 3
Model comparison, knowledge restructuring task
Model No. Free Parameters NLL BIC
1 4 24,535 (25,051) 24,557 (25,074)
2 103 23,366 (23,833) 23,950 (24,416)
3 103 23,837 (24,641) 24,421 (25,224)
4 103 23,826 (24,421) 24,409 (25,005)
5 103 22,915 (23,924) 23,499 (24,507)
6 400 21,165 (21,709) 23,431 (23,975)
Notes. We compared model fit under different constraints of the number of parameters. Model 1: single
set of parameters {L, b, a0, } ﬁxed across all participants. Model 2: different number of particles L per partic-
ipant, with {b, a0, } ﬁxed across participants. Model 3: different bias b per participant, with {L, a0, } ﬁxed
across participants. Model 4: different shape a0 per participant, with {L, b, } ﬁxed across participants. Model
5: different noise  per participant, with {L, b, a0} ﬁxed across participants. Model 6: single set of parameters
per participant. Values for the maximum-probability choice rule are shown in parentheses. BIC, Bayesian infor-
mation criterion; NLL, negative log likelihood.
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between transfer tests of the model qualitatively resemble the empirical data (cf.
Fig. 1C). Similarly, Fig. 9B confirms that the model generalizes its categorization behav-
ior to test stimuli in a strategy-dependent manner that closely resembles the “ideal”
response profiles (cf. Fig. 1B), and the generalization patterns of participants (see fig. 7
in Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012). Splitting the best-fit parameters according to the num-
ber of particles into top and bottom quartiles also leads to a pattern of changes in context
sensitivity that qualitatively resembles that of participants when grouped by WMC scores:
simulations using greater numbers of particles show larger CS changes (compare Figs. 9C
and 1D).
When we examined the relationships between individuals’ average WMC scores and
best-fitting parameters (Fig. 9D), we found that there was no significant correlation between
WMC and best-fit number of particles (r(98) = .09, p = .38, n.s.). However, this correlation
analysis is affected by tradeoffs between parameters, which would likely act to reduce the
correlation coefficient. A more robust analysis comes from comparing a slope-intercept
model, in which WMC is assumed to be linearly related to the number of particles, to an
intercept-only model, where the number of particles is assumed to be fixed and independent
of WMC; the other parameters are free to vary, as this analysis is less affected by parameter
tradeoffs (the same analysis was applied to the SHJ results, above). A slope-intercept model
(NLL = 22,045, BIC = 23,756) was found to fit this relationship better than an intercept-
only model (NLL = 22,078, BIC = 23,786), but the best-fitting slope was small, suggesting
a rather weak effect (b1 = 9; black line in Fig. 9D).
As in the SHJ tasks, we found a significant negative correlation between WMC and
guessing rate  (r(98) = .26, p < .01; Fig. 9E). A slope-intercept model with slope
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b1 = 0.3 (NLL = 22,153, BIC = 23,863) ﬁt better than an intercept-only model
(NLL = 22,326, BIC = 24,032).
We found no significant correlation between WMC and shape a0 (r
(98) = .03, p = .75, n.s.; Fig. 9F). A slope-intercept model (NLL = 21,473,
BIC = 23,184), with slope b1 = 0.4, was found to fit this relationship better than an
intercept-only model (NLL = 21,496, BIC = 23,201).
Finally, there was a significant correlation between WMC and bias b (r(98) = .27,
p < .01; Fig. 9G). A slope-intercept model (NLL = 21,459, BIC = 23,170), with slope
b1 = 0.9, was found to fit this relationship better than an intercept-only model
(NLL = 21,489, BIC = 23,194).
As in the SHJ case, it was of interest to examine how these best-fitting parameters
potentially traded off against each other. We found a negative correlation between the
number of particles L and the guessing rate  (r(98) = .40, p < .01). We also found that
bias b was positively correlated with number of particles L (r(98) = .44, p < .01), and
negatively correlated with the guessing rate (r(98) = .59, p < .01). Other correlations
were not signiﬁcant.
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4. Discussion
Dealing with the world’s many uncertainties in a consistent and principled manner
presents a formidable computational challenge. That humans routinely do so despite
necessarily finite cognitive resources is an impressive feat. Algorithms for approximate
Bayesian inference provide one natural source of ideas for how this may be achieved.
Thus, one suggestion has been that people may approximate Bayesian computations by
representing and manipulating a set of samples drawn according to the relevant proba-
bility distributions (Sanborn & Chater, 2016), that is, by implementing Monte Carlo
inference (Gelfand & Smith, 1990; Gordon et al., 1993). Such methods admit a spec-
trum of degrees of approximation, from essentially ideal performance given plentiful
computational resources (e.g., a large number of samples), to much coarser approxima-
tions when such resources are scarce (e.g., few samples). In the current work, we con-
sidered constraints on working memory capacity (WMC) in the context of probabilistic
inference, asking whether parallels may be drawn between WMC limitations and
resource-constrained, approximate Bayesian inference. In particular, we hypothesized
that variations in task performance that correlate with WMC would be captured by
assuming that WMC directly reflects the number of samples, or “particles,” available to
perform inference.
To test this, we focused on experiments that suggest a positive association between
WMC and two apparently disparate aspects of categorization: (a) the ease with which
novel categories are learned (Lewandowsky, 2011); and (b) the ability to switch between
different categorization strategies (Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012). We saw that such cat-
egorization tasks can be considered probabilistic inference problems in which individuals
seek to infer the most probable category structure(s) given their prior assumptions and
what they subsequently observe. We assumed that individuals approximate inference by
representing and manipulating in working memory a relatively small number of hypothe-
ses (samples/particles) about the possible underlying category structures. The number of
hypotheses an individual is able to entertain at a given time was assumed to depend on
his or her WMC.
Support for our principal hypothesis was decidedly mixed. On the one hand, we pro-
vided a “proof of concept” that increasing the number of particles in our algorithm could
both hasten category learning and improve switching performance, at least on average. In
simulations of the SHJ problem types, we also found that the degree to which increasing
the number of particles differentially improved performance in the problem types was
closely matched to the manner in which higher WMC is differentially associated with
improved performance in these problem types; this pattern was not matched as well by
changes in other parameters. Furthermore, when the model was fit to individuals’ behav-
ior in the knowledge restructuring experiment of Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012), linear
regression between WMC and number of particles suggested a positive—albeit rather
weak—relationship. On the other hand, when the model was fit to individuals’ perfor-
mance in the SHJ tasks (Lewandowsky, 2011), model comparison did not support a vari-
ant in which the number of particles changes as a function of WMC. Rather, the winning
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model favored setting the number of particles to one, and captured individual variation in
performance through the guessing-rate, or “noise,” parameter. Possible reasons for this
mixed picture are discussed next.
4.1. Limitations
One possible reason for our failure to find a relationship in the SHJ case is the rela-
tively weak effect of varying the number of particles on learning rate. That is, although
we demonstrated that increasing the number of particles could hasten category learning in
these problems, the effect was subtle—the improvement in learning was relatively small,
and generally reached asymptote at a comparatively small number of particles (cf.
Fig. 6A).
A second contributory factor to the mixed picture—though we believe our regression
analyses mitigate this—is likely the substantial correlations between model parameters. In
formulating the category learning model, we included the possibility that various of its
parameters—not just number of particles—would show variation when fit to behavior. As
our results made clear, the parameters showed substantial correlations, making the job of
disentangling their effects more difficult. In the SHJ case, the best-fitting model had a
separate noise/guessing-rate  for each participant, with other parameters ﬁxed across par-
ticipants; both correlation and regression indicated a negative relationship between WMC
and , suggesting that higher WMC participants were less “noisy” in their choices. When
we allowed all parameters to vary between individuals (the second best ﬁtting model), we
saw that  and shape a0 were signiﬁcantly positively correlated, as one might anticipate—
recall that a higher a0 leads to more tolerance of category structures with mixed labels,
which would lead to more errors. Furthermore, a0 was negatively correlated with the num-
ber of particles L, which is also expected, since an increasing number of particles tends to
reduce the number of errors. However, in this case we found no signiﬁcant correlation
between particles L and , which we might have expected given their tendencies to
decrease and increase errors, respectively. In the knowledge restructuring experiment, the
best model allowed all parameters to vary between participants, and here we did indeed
ﬁnd that L and  were negatively correlated. The fact that the bias parameter b was respec-
tively positively and negatively correlated with L and  also makes sense, since a lower
bias would tend to generate more classiﬁcation errors. Although we haven’t demonstrated
it here, we expect that b and L would also interact in strategy-switching, in addition to the
category learning phase, since a higher bias may require a larger number of particles to
ensure that switching occurs reliably.
Clearly, our model has multiple sources of variability, or “noise,” that trade off in
ways that unfortunately make it difficult to draw strong conclusions from our model-
fitting results. Of course, this is not an uncommon scenario, and the challenge of appor-
tioning behavioral variability to different possible sources is a general one. In relation to
the latter, it is interesting that we found in all cases that a model with a relatively low
number of particles (i.e., in the range of 0–100) fit better than a model with a large num-
ber (10,000) of particles. The purpose of the latter was to approximate exact inference
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more closely, thereby providing a comparison in which noise in the inference process (as
opposed to other sources of noise, such as in the choice process) was minimized. The
finding therefore lends some support to the idea that inference noise plays a role in
accounting for variability in participants’ behavior (e.g., Wyart & Koechlin, 2016). How-
ever, we would caution against drawing too strong a conclusion here—though we did not
see much evidence of floor/ceiling effects in our fitting results, a more decisive compar-
ison would involve an expanded range of parameters (e.g., considering  on the full range
[0, 1]).
We also found that a probability-matching choice rule always fit the data better than a
maximum-probability choice rule. Probability-matching behavior has previously been
reported in the categorization literature (Estes et al., 1989; Gluck & Bower, 1988), so this
result is perhaps not surprising, even if it is strictly suboptimal in this setting. However,
in the context of our model, it is difficult to assign responsibility for probability matching
to the inference or choice mechanism, since probability matching could conceivably arise
from either separately, or both together. Indeed, since an inference mechanism based on
sampling, such as the one we have described, would naturally tend to probability match-
ing under a limited number of samples (cf. Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum,
2014), the addition of a probability-matching choice process makes disentangling these
separate sources of variability particularly challenging.
Why, then, did we include noise in the choice process at all? Here, the motivation was
simply to improve model fit—at least some participants’ behavior was more variable than
even a severely resource-constrained particle filter (i.e., a single particle). The guessing
rate therefore primarily represents our ignorance about variability arising from sources
distinct from sample-based inference (e.g., attentional lapses). It is interesting that in both
experiments the best-fitting model had guessing rates that were negatively correlated with
WMC. This is consistent with observations that an increase in WMC load is accompanied
with what look like random responses (e.g., Adam, Vogel, & Awh, 2017; Zhang & Luck,
2008), since we would then expect individuals with lower WMC (as well as higher
WMC individuals under increased memory load) to guess more often because their
capacity is lower. However, given that our starting point was the operationalization of
WMC in terms of number of particles L, the fact that we only found a negative correla-
tion between L and  in one of the two experiments is only partially consistent with this.
Another limitation concerns our model’s inability to handle particular attentional phe-
nomena. In our presentation of the results of Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012), we briefly
highlighted that high-WMC participants displayed significantly greater changes in context
sensitivity (CS) in Session 1 but not in Session 2, where low-WMC participants appeared
to “catch up”; in our model, by contrast, there is no reason to expect the amount of CS
change to vary for different sessions (compare Figs. 2D and 9C). At least some of the
asymmetry in the human data is likely to arise due to attentional factors that are not
included in our model. In particular, Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012) noted that partici-
pants in the KP-first condition generally found it easier to switch in Session 1 than partic-
ipants in the CI-first condition (compare the magnitude of CS change between transfer
tests 1 and 2 for the two conditions in Fig. 2C). In their interpretation of this, Sewell and
K. Lloyd et al. / Cognitive Science 43 (2019) 33 of 43
Lewandowsky appealed to dimensional relevance shifts, and specifically to evidence that
it is easier to attend to a previously relevant dimension than to a previously ignored
dimension (e.g., Kruschke, 1996). Thus, in the CI-first condition, participants initially
learn to ignore one of the dimensions (color, or “context”), since it is not involved in the
CI strategy; this means that it will be harder to switch to the KP strategy, since the latter
requires attending to the previously ignored dimension. In the KP-first condition, by con-
trast, participants initially attend to all stimulus dimensions, so do not have to learn to
attend to a previously ignored dimension. A modest augmentation of the current model
with a prior that incorporates the assumption that only a subset of stimulus dimensions
may be relevant to classification (i.e., a sparsity assumption) would conceivably address
the asymmetry between KP-first and CI-first conditions, but presumably not the fact that
low-WMC participants appear to catch up with high-WMC participants in Session 2.
Finally, we should of course consider the possibility that the class of Bayesian CART
models considered here may not be most appropriate. The principal motivation for focus-
ing on this class was the intuition that a tree-based representation, following a sequence
of axis-aligned partitions of stimulus space, was a natural fit to the task domains. It would
certainly be of interest, however, to compare the performance of the current approach
with those of alternative category representations (e.g., Anderson, 1991; Ashby et al.,
1998; Love et al., 2004).
4.2. WMC and search efficiency
Category learning in the model proceeded quicker with more samples due to what
we might refer to as increased search efficiency. Category structures that represent
“good” solutions to the category learning problem were those with high posterior proba-
bility, and so the inference problem could be thought of in terms of search for such cat-
egory structures in the hypothesis space (cf. Fig. 4). The more resources available to
search this space—the more samples—then the more likely it is that (a) a good solution
is discovered at all, and (b) a good solution is discovered quickly. In our simulations,
we found that the marginal benefit to learning rate of increasing the number of samples
was rapidly diminishing (cf. Fig. 6A), though we expect the point at which this occurs
to depend on both the complexity of the problem and the precise details of the infer-
ence algorithm.
In more psychological terms, the implication is that the greater the number of hypothe-
ses that one can entertain and manipulate within working memory, the more likely that
one will quickly discover good solutions. The idea of exploring a space of solutions is of
course well-established in psychology, where problem-solving has long been cast in such
terms (Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon, 1983). There, however, the search problem is con-
ventionally defined in terms of finding a path from an initial state to an explicit goal state
while minimizing the path cost. This is rather different from the search in the present
case, which is best described in terms of simple stochastic hill-climbing in the absence of
an explicit goal representation or, indeed, a path cost. Nevertheless, the idea that one
may have greater or lesser resources with which to search may be fruitful in considering
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the link between WMC and problem solving more generally (Hambrick & Engle, 2003).
Other stochastic sampling algorithms that have been applied to finding action sequences
in large search spaces, such as Monte Carlo tree search (Coulom, 2006; Gelly & Silver,
2011), may also be a natural source of inspiration in such settings.
Interestingly, we also found some evidence in the data of Lewandowsky (2011) that
WMC may interact with extent of Type II advantage in the SHJ tasks. Additional analysis
of the experimental data was prompted by the observation in our model that the degree
of Type II advantage appeared to be modulated by the number of particles (cf. Fig. 6A).
This is consistent with the recent suggestion, in the context of category learning in older
adults, that Type II advantage is modulated by WMC (Rabi & Minda, 2016), though our
present model does not speak to the observation that relative performance on Type II and
Type IV problems may sometimes reverse (e.g., in older adults—see Badham, Sanborn,
& Maylor, 2017; Rabi & Minda, 2016).
4.3. WMC and flexibility
A greater number of samples led not only to faster category learning, but also to an
improved ability to switch between categorization strategies. This was due to an increase
in what we might call representational adequacy. That is, with a greater number of sam-
ples, the full posterior distribution over category structures was more accurately repre-
sented, encompassing category structures that were assigned lower probability. By
representing this greater plurality of category structures, the model could easily express
alternative hypotheses when instructed to switch strategy, as operationalized by a
reweighting of the current sample/hypothesis set (cf. Fig. 5).
Again, in more psychological terms, the obvious interpretation is that the greater one’s
ability to entertain a variety of hypotheses, the more flexible one will be. There is evi-
dence that individuals with higher WMC are better at solving the so-called insight prob-
lems, and this may be because such problems are exactly those that require keeping in
mind several different possibilities (Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009; Murray & Byrne, 2005).
Indeed, insight problems typically involve inducing task representations in participants
which are not conducive to solving the problem, and so require “restructuring” of the ini-
tial task representation (Ohlsson, 1992; Weisberg, 1995).
4.4. Related work
The current study is framed by a number of related strands of research. Most perti-
nently, Lewandowsky and colleagues have themselves previously addressed the experi-
mental results discussed here, though using a rather different modeling approach.
Lewandowsky (2011) found that individual differences in category learning performance
could be captured by varying only the learning rate of a particular category learning
model (ALCOVE; Kruschke, 1992), but did not establish a rationale for why WMC
should be related to this parameter. Sewell and Lewandowsky (2011) found that while a
“single-module” model such as ALCOVE failed to capture the general ability to fluidly
switch between categorization strategies, a “multiple-module” model, such as ATRIUM
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(Erickson & Kruschke, 1998)—which is able to learn more than one mapping between
stimuli and category labels—could do so. However, a mechanism by which such recoor-
dination could take place was not proposed, nor was the issue of why WMC should be
related to this ability addressed. In the current work, we provide a model able to capture
both experimental results using a single mechanism (i.e., variation in the number of sam-
ples), propose a simple mechanism for how recoordination could occur (i.e., importance
reweighting), and offer rationales for why WMC may be associated with faster learning
(search efficiency) and flexibility (representational adequacy).
Levy et al. (2008) directly anticipate our suggestion that the number of samples used
for inference may be equated with WMC in their exploration of “garden path” effects in
sentence processing. Briefly, garden path sentences (e.g., “The old man the boat.”) are
grammatical sentences that people typically fail to parse correctly, at least at first, due to
early parts of the sentence tending to promote one (incorrect) interpretation over another.
This initial interpretation then leads to subsequent difficulties of comprehension. Levy
et al. (2008) suggested that difficulties in parsing such sentences correctly—and in partic-
ular, the probability of successfully re-parsing the sentence in light of disambiguating
information arriving late in the sentence—may be explained by constraints on the
resources (i.e., number of samples) available for incremental parsing. They showed that a
particle filter model for performing online inference could reproduce these phenomena,
with variation of the number of particles altering the strength of the effects. In particular,
as the number of particles decreased, the probability that the correct interpretation of the
sentence was not represented in the ensemble—leading to parse failure—increased. This
is exactly analogous to the mechanism suggested to account for category switching per-
formance in the current work: a lower number of particles makes it less likely that the
alternative strategy is represented, meaning that the probability of being able to switch is
decreased. However, the current work goes beyond Levy et al. (2008) both in expanding
the range of phenomena explained (i.e., both switching and learning effects) and in actu-
ally measuring correlations between best-fit model parameters and WMC scores.
The HyGene model of Dougherty and colleagues (Dougherty, Thomas, & Lange,
2010; Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & Harbison, 2008) is also closely related to the cur-
rent work. HyGene provides a general framework for diagnostic inference, incorporating
processes by which hypotheses may be generated and maintained in working memory.
This includes the assumption that working memory processes constrain the number of
hypotheses that one can actively maintain, though to the best of our knowledge this
framework has not been applied to the domain of category learning that we consider
here.
Finally, a number of previous models have considered the category learning problem
in Bayesian terms (Anderson, 1991; Goodman et al., 2008; Sanborn et al., 2006, 2010).
Notably, both Sanborn et al. (2006, 2010) and Goodman et al. (2008), despite considering
rather different category representations, considered sample-based inference to be a par-
ticularly good candidate as a psychological mechanism for approximating Bayesian infer-
ence. For example, Sanborn et al. found that they were able to replicate a wide range of
category learning effects by fitting relatively few samples to experimental data, though
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individual differences were not explored in that work. Our use of a representation based
on classification and regression trees (CART) was primarily driven by pragmatic reasons,
in particular what seemed most natural for the tasks concerned, rather than a theoretical
commitment to a particular way of representing categories. We expect similar results to
be obtained with alternative category representations, such as those used in the Rational
Model of Categorization (Anderson, 1990; Sanborn et al., 2010) and Rational Rules
(Goodman et al., 2008), though this remains to be shown.
4.5. Future directions
The current work suggests a number of avenues for future investigation. One is to further
explore the relative contributions of different components of the inference process. For
example, search in the model effectively relies on two processes. The first is resampling, in
which particles with lower probability are discarded and particles with higher probability
are copied. Intuitively, this should be beneficial for learning since search is then focused on
more “promising” (i.e., high probability) regions of hypothesis space. The second process is
the proposal and acceptance/rejection of new hypotheses via MCMC moves, leading to local
hill-climbing in probability space. A more detailed understanding of how these processes
interact, and how they may relate to various psychological phenomena, would be of interest.
Similarly, one could consider alternative conceptualizations of the process by which
participants switch between different categorization strategies. We implemented strategy-
switching as a simple reweighting operation on particles according to a new target distri-
bution. One consequence of this modeling choice is that it may be impossible—at least
for the initial time step—to switch to a new strategy if the corresponding region of
hypothesis space is not represented. Though we found some hints of bimodality in the
human data, the prospect of such “catastrophic failure” may not seem entirely realistic,
so one could imagine exploring modifications such as allowing additional propose-accept/
reject steps during this phase.
More generally, it is likely that there is a trade-off between the sophistication of the
processes by which individual hypotheses are maintained and manipulated, and the num-
ber of such hypotheses that one would need to support. In other words, one could pre-
sumably replace a larger number of relatively “dumb” particles/hypotheses with a smaller
number of comparatively “smart” particles/hypotheses. Indeed, it has recently been sug-
gested that, at least when considering more global hypotheses about the world where the
hypothesis space becomes particularly complex, only one hypothesis would plausibly be
represented (Bramley, Dayan, Griffiths, & Lagnado, 2017). How to negotiate this spec-
trum of possibilities is a pressing challenge.
Clearly, future work should also test whether the current modeling approach can be
applied to other category learning tasks and beyond. As mentioned in the Introduction, it
has been suggested that category learning tasks which can be solved with relatively sim-
ple, verbalizable rules (“rule-based” tasks) are especially reliant on working memory,
while tasks with solutions that generally defy description in terms of simple rules
(“information-integration” tasks) are not (Ashby & Maddox, 2005, 2011; Ashby &
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O’Brien, 2005). However, recent results suggest rather that working memory is equally
involved in these different types of task (Craig & Lewandowsky, 2012; Lewandowsky
et al., 2012). An obvious first step would therefore be to assess whether the current
approach can be applied to tasks that are more clearly of the information-integration type.
A broader challenge for rational process models is to find constraints that will help
determine more precisely the algorithms that underpin cognition. In the present work, we
followed previous suggestions that inference algorithms based on Monte Carlo sampling
are promising, but this only weakly constrains the variety of models under consideration.
Determining the signatures of particular modeling choices within this larger class, and
how these may succeed or fail in matching features of human cognition and behavior, is
a substantial task for future research.
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Notes
1. In both experiments, p = 3, but we use the more general notation for presentation
purposes.
2. Of course, in reality, bar position and height were much more restricted than indicated
—we mean only to emphasize by the use of R that these are continuous variables.
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Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found
online in the Supporting Information section at the end
of the article:
Fig. S1. Interaction of Type II advantage with working
memory capacity. Average learning curves (1 SE) for
Types II and IV in the experiment of Lewandowsky
(2011) for (A) all participants; (B) participants with
lower-median WMC scores; and (C) participants with
upper-median WMC scores. Only the high WMC partici-
pants show a Type II advantage (see main text for statis-
tics).
Fig. S2. Participants’ context-sensitivity changes and
switch probabilities. (A) Distribution of (absolute)
changes in context sensitivity (DCS; pooling over both
test sessions) for low (left) and high (right) WMC partici-
pants. (B) The probability of making a successful switch
of categorization strategy goes up with increasing WMC.
Mean probabilities of a successful switch were, respec-
tively, .64, .77, .89, and .96 for participants with WMC
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scores in the lower quartile (↓25), lower median (↓50),
upper median (↑50), and upper quartile (↑25) of the
experimental population. These scores are superimposed,
for comparison, on the probability of switching as a func-
tion of the number of particles obtained from simulations
(cf. Fig. 8B). As in the simulation results, a successful
switch is defined as a change in context sensitivity
between test sessions, DCS, that “crosses” a score of 0.5.
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